Racially Territorial Policing in Black
Neighborhoods
Elise C. Boddie†
This Essay explores police practices that marginalize Black people by limiting
their freedom of movement across the spaces of Black neighborhoods. In an earlier
article, I theorized “racial territoriality” as a form of discrimination that “excludes
people of color from—or marginalizes them within—racialized White spaces that
have a racially exclusive history, practice, and/or reputation.” In this Essay, I consider how my theory of racial territoriality could apply to policing. It offers an account of how police not only criminalize Black people but also criminalize Black
spaces, ostensibly justifying them—and the people who live in or frequent them—as
“natural” targets for police activity. As an example of racially territorial policing, the
Essay discusses the Supreme Court’s decision in Illinois v. Wardlow and the costs
that it imposes by granting police significant discretion to stop people in areas that
they define—often inaccurately, according to some research—as having high levels
of crime.

INTRODUCTION
This Essay proposes a new lens for evaluating an old problem:
the harms of policing in Black neighborhoods. It calls attention to
what I have theorized in another context as “racial territoriality”—a form of discrimination that excludes people of color from,
or marginalizes them within, “spaces that have a racially exclusive history, practice, and/or reputation.” 1 In this Essay, I offer
my theory to suggest that police not only criminalize Black people
but also criminalize Black spaces, ostensibly justifying them—
and the people who live in or frequent them—as “natural” targets for police activity. By highlighting the role that spatial
meaning plays in policing, I aim to expand the conversation
about the dynamics of police behavior in Black neighborhoods
and its human cost, including the limitations that police place on
the freedom of Black people to move about. As an example of racially territorial policing, I discuss the Supreme Court’s decision
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in Illinois v. Wardlow 2 and the harms that it has created by
granting police significant discretion to stop people in areas that
they define—often inaccurately, according to some research—as
having high levels of crime. I leave it to others to evaluate the
utility of this proposed frame and whether its contributions are
productive.
I. WHAT IS RACIAL TERRITORIALITY?
Racial territoriality is a spatial system of racial control,
grounded in the logic of the Jim Crow era, that operates according
to perceptions of where people should—and should not—be based
on their race. Understanding racial territoriality as a system requires focus not only on interactions between individuals (police
and residents, for example) but also consideration of how spatial
context shapes those interactions. When we evaluate racial territoriality, we look to the racial demographics of space—that is,
whether it is associated with Black people or other racial and
ethnic groups—as well as to its racial meaning.
Appreciating the social dimensions of space is key to understanding the dynamics of racial territoriality. 3 Space is “more
than neutral coordinates on a map” 4 or “a physical set of boundaries or associations.” 5 Rather, space is socially constructed based
on what people see, how they experience their space, 6 and the resulting meanings they consciously or subconsciously project onto
it. 7 These interpretations “correlate with and reinforce cultural
norms about spatial belonging and power.” 8
Racial territoriality unfolds in stages. The first step begins
when people classify space according to “perceptions, attitudes,
and cultural norms” as well as sentiments about the space and its
relative importance to individuals or groups. 9 People map racial

528 U.S. 119 (2000).
Boddie, supra note 1, at 443 (defining “territory” as a “space that is controlled to
some degree by people,” and “incorporat[ing] Robert Sack’s definition of human territoriality
‘as the attempt by an individual or group to affect, influence, or control people, phenomena,
and relationships, by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area” (quoting
ROBERT DAVID SACK, HUMAN TERRITORIALITY 19 (1986))).
4
Id. at 434.
5
Id. at 438.
6
Id. at 435.
7
Id. at 434–35.
8
Boddie, supra note 1, at 438.
9
Id. at 443.
2
3
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meaning onto space—i.e., racialize it—based on its actual or imagined associations with particular racial groups. For example, if
mostly Black people live in a neighborhood, many will likely identify it as a “Black neighborhood.” Racial biases about groups associated with a given space, whether implicit or explicit, can also
be projected onto the space. 10 This constellation of mental and
social-emotional processes generates the second stage of territoriality. At this stage, conscious and unconscious assumptions
about who is supposed to be in a particular space leads those with
power to create and maintain boundaries that control access to it
or micromanage movement within it. 11 These assumptions—
which are grounded in personal and collective experiences, narratives, and memory—will continue to drive patterns of social behavior that continually reproduce the space’s meaning unless and
until the cycle is disrupted.
Space can have different meanings for different people. For
example, assume that, during a five-month crime spree several
years ago, a few dozen local residents were robbed at gunpoint in
a neighborhood park. Unable to shake their memory of that time,
some residents have decided not to return. They continue to see
the park as dangerous. Later, local musicians decide to stage festivals and concerts in the park in order to reclaim it. As residents
come to associate the park with celebration rather than danger,
it assumes new meaning as a safe and joyful community space.
My point here is that the meaning of space is often contingent; it varies according to who is interpreting it and how they
process their spatial experiences. Before the musicians in the
above example salvaged the park, locals knew it only as a place
where people had been violently attacked. Without a countervailing narrative, the park’s identity as an unsafe space would be
difficult to dislodge. Once the park was spatially rehabilitated,
however, it took on a different meaning.
I suggest that the same spatial dynamics could apply to policing. Once again, the meaning of space can vary according to who is
perceiving it. While police may think of spaces in Black neighborhoods as disorderly, residents may have a more nuanced understanding that does not emphasize crime. Here, residents view
crime as only one aspect of life in the neighborhood; crime does

10
11

Id. at 437–42.
Id. at 444.

480

The University of Chicago Law Review

[89:2

not necessarily define the neighborhood. 12 Similarly, where the
police see distressed space, residents may see the place where
they grew up and where their families live—a place of personal
and shared memories. Because they have deeper ties to the neighborhood, residents are more likely to see its complexity.
Another point bears mentioning here: space is dynamic. Its
meaning shapes expectations about who belongs. If those expectations continue to be met, the meaning of the space will remain
the same. If expectations change, however, the meaning of the
space will be destabilized and reconstituted to align with new spatial understandings or interpretations. For example, if a group
uses the local public school’s gym for choir practice every Saturday
at 9:00 a.m., the choral director will naturally assume that anyone who shows up at the gym at that time is there to learn how to
sing. If the gym is later used for basketball, the coach will expect
her players to show up—not the members of the choir. Again, the
key here is the shift in spatial meaning, which produces assumptions about who is supposed to be in the gym. These assumptions
are so natural that people may not even be aware of the mental
processes that produce them. 13
II. RACIALLY TERRITORIAL POLICING
The previous Part discussed how meaning is projected onto space
and the consequences of that dynamic. This Part explains how
these insights could apply to policing in Black neighborhoods.
A. How Police Define and Regulate Space
Control over space is fundamental to policing. Police regulate
the movement of people through space—and create and maintain
boundaries to limit spatial access. 14 For example, police detain
12 See Monica C. Bell, Anti-segregation Policing, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 650, 720 (2020)
(“[C]ollective and individual memories, including memories of racial violence and injustice,
are not always based on complete information. The value of memories is not so much in
their accuracy as in their function as lenses through which people interpret the world,
lenses that guide future action.”).
13 See Boddie, supra note 1, at 439.
14 See generally STEVE HERBERT, POLICING SPACE: TERRITORIALITY AND THE LOS
ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT (1997) (describing the various ways that space influences
the exercise of police power). See also Daanika B. Gordon, Policing the Segregated City:
Redistricting and the Spatial Organization of Police Work 1 (May 9, 2018) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison) (on file with author) (“Policing is a
fundamentally spatial enterprise. From the department to the beat, police work is organized
around clearly demarcated geographic units.”).
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people who are suspected of a crime, put up barriers at crime
scenes to keep people out, and manage foot traffic in crowded city
streets by directing people to other areas. In other words, police
control people by controlling space—those who “belong” are allowed to remain; those who do not may be excluded outright or
mistreated within the space itself. This insider–outsider distinction defines police authority and helps police assess the kind of
power that they think necessary to maintain control and protect
public safety. 15 For instance, if a group of people refuse to follow
an order to move, they run the risk of being arrested.
Police regulation of space has a dark side. As Professor
Daanika Gordon observes, when police “regulate the kinds of
people and activities found in particular areas,” they “produce
and reproduce understandings of how orderly, secure, dangerous,
or criminal discrete geographies can be.” 16 Thus, police not only
respond to the spatial environment but also help create it. They
shape how people experience space—and, thus, the space’s meaning, including “whether an area feels secure or dangerous, cared
for or neglected.” 17 Gordon’s observation points to a negative consequence of heavy police presence in Black communities: because
such a presence “virtually ensures that Blacks (or other nonWhites) will be observed, questioned, and arrested at rates that
substantially overstate objective racial differences in offending,”18
it engenders stereotypes that criminalize Black spaces and the
people within them. These stereotypes pose another risk—that
Black communities’ interests regarding policing will be discounted, especially when compared to those of White neighborhoods. For example, police may “prioritize efforts to sustain economic stability and growth” in White areas but choose to focus
exclusively on violence in Black areas “despite residents’ more

See HERBERT, supra note 14, at 14–15.
Daanika Gordon, The Police as Place-Consolidators: The Organizational Amplification of Urban Inequality, 45 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 3 (2020); see also Amna A. Akbar,
An Abolitionist Horizon for (Police) Reform, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 1781, 1797–99 (2020) (collecting sources and describing the role of police in producing and entrenching inequality).
17 Gordon, supra note 16, at 2.
18 Id. at 6 (quoting Graham C. Ousey & Matthew R. Lee, Racial Disparity in Formal
Social Control: An Investigation of Alternative Explanations of Arrest Rate Inequality, J.
RSCH. CRIME & DELINQ. 322, 331 (2008)).
15
16
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varied concerns.” 19 Here, spatial meaning drives police responsiveness in White neighborhoods while leading them to ignore
Black communities’ assessments of their needs.
B. The Harms
Racial stereotypes of space influence police interactions
within communities. Some of these stereotypes define Black
spaces as dangerous and guilty and White spaces as safe and innocent. 20 These perceptions matter. As Professor Monica Bell explains, “[n]eighborhood characteristics” help determine how police
exercise their discretion, including “whether and how crime is
detected and coded,” 21 the level and degree of “suspicion officers
bring to observations and interactions,” 22 and the “level of force
[they] are likely to use.” 23 Police presumptions of illegality in
Black spaces may be used to rationalize police occupation and
control of such spaces through force. 24
Racially territorial policing also exacts personal harms. Recall
the second stage of racial territoriality: police project onto space
racial assumptions about who belongs. The resulting police practices limit the ability of those who are assumed not to belong to
move through the “spaces of everyday life,” which demeans their
dignity. 25 People who are subjected to racial territoriality “experience the world as outsiders,” are excluded from full participation

19 Id. at 13; see also Devon W. Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence: A Provisional Model
of Some of the Causes, 104 GEO. L.J. 1479, 1494 (2016) (describing the role that police play
in controlling social and economic resources in places by enacting borders and reconfiguring “opportunities and various social structures” such as “housing, schools, public transportation, [and] parks”).
20 See Martha R. Mahoney, Segregation, Whiteness, and Transformation, 143 U. PA.
L. REV. 1659, 1664 (1995) (“For Whites, White neighborhoods become part of the ‘natural’
world, helping to keep their Whiteness unnoticed and undisturbed, and helping to equate
Whiteness with something that reflects positive values and feels like home.”).
21 Bell, supra note 12, at 715.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 716 (citing William Terrill & Michael D. Reisig, Neighborhood Context and
Police Use of Force, 40 J. RSCH. CRIME & DELINQ. 291, 306 (2003)).
24 See Tia Sherèe Gaynor, Seong C. Kang & Brian N. Williams, Segregated Spaces
and Separated Races: The Relationship Between State-Sanctioned Violence, Place, and
Black Identity, 7 RUSSELL SAGE FOUND. J. SOC. SCIS., Feb. 2021, at 50, 61. Professors Tia
Gaynor, Seong Kang, and Brian Williams further observe that “[f]indings support the notion
that race still matters and that the iconic ghetto represented by [B]lack bodies, perceptions
of crime, disorder, and dystopia associated with [B]lack spaces, and the negative connotations of [B]lackness continue to endure as powerful sources for stereotype, prejudice, discrimination, and state-sanctioned violence.” Id.
25 See Boddie, supra note 1, at 420.
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in society26 and are denied agency over their bodies in the spaces
where they live. Thus, racial territoriality denies its subjects the
benefits of ordinariness—the ability to just be without being stigmatized and denigrated. 27 It contributes to a sense that there is
no place where Black people can be both safe and free. 28
Segregation exacerbates racially territorial policing. 29 It allows
police to territorialize Black spaces through selective law enforcement, while ignoring crime in higher-income White communities.
Professor Bell describes this dynamic:
[I]nsider accounts suggest that department policy encouraged
greater police presence in predominantly poor and African
American neighborhoods, even for officers who were not assigned to those areas. Former Baltimore police officer Michael
Wood told reporters that, after getting a plum assignment to
an upper-middle-class, predominantly [W]hite neighborhood,
he would sometimes leave his post to go to a poor, predominantly [B]lack neighborhood to make arrests. He needed to
meet his expected number of arrests, but even though there
were people using drugs and committing other crimes in the
neighborhood where he was assigned, he knew that there
would be “trouble” if he arrested the wrong person. 30

26

Id.
See generally Elise C. Boddie, Ordinariness as Equality, 93 IND. L.J. 57 (2018). See
also R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79
N.Y.U. L. REV. 803, 816–23 (2004).
28 Racially territorial policing also contributes to what Bell has conceptualized as
“legal estrangement” in poor Black communities. Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the
Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126 YALE L.J. 2054, 2054 (describing “legal estrangement” as “a theory of detachment and eventual alienation from the law’s enforcers” that
“reflects the intuition among many people in poor communities of color that the law operates to exclude them from society”); see also id. at 2107 (explaining that “vicarious marginalization in the context of policing, then, is ultimately about how people draw upon
information other than their own experiences as police targets or suspects to understand
their group’s common experience with law enforcement”).
29 See, e.g., Bell, supra note 12, at 655 (describing the “mutually constitutive relationship between daily practices of urban policing and residential segregation”); Akbar,
supra note 16, at 1797 (“Police are a conduit of segregation, gentrification, and displacement, creating and maintaining spatially and racially concentrated inequality.”); I. Bennett
Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 43, 72 (2009) (demonstrating
“that how we police, and what we police, both contribute to perpetuating segregation along
race lines”). See generally, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan & Elliott Ash, New Policing, New Segregation: From Ferguson to New York, 106 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 33 (2017) (exploring the various
ways that policing reproduces and incentivizes segregation).
30 See Bell, supra note 28, at 2125.
27
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In this account, the police officer is less concerned with public
safety than with satisfying his quota of arrests. He achieves his
quota by policing Black neighborhoods outside his territory instead of targeting illicit activity in the White neighborhoods to
which he has been assigned. Through this selective enforcement,
he reinforces racial stereotypes of Black criminality and White
innocence—assumptions that are drawn from police presence in
the Black neighborhood and the absence of police in the White
one. Significantly, these stereotypes are projected not only onto
people but are also mapped onto the places where they live or
frequent.
Another harm of racially territorial policing is the stigma—
both spatial and individual—that it imposes and the risk that
people might internalize its negative meaning. 31 There is also the
risk that excessive police presence can pose to the safety of Black
people, especially when police harbor—and consistently act
upon—presumptions of Black guilt.
To illustrate how these harms converge, consider the following scenario: A police officer is patrolling a Black neighborhood
that has recently experienced an increase in petty crime. The
officer sees a Black teenager (let’s call him Charles) running down
the street at 6:00 a.m. Charles is rushing to catch a city bus that
will take him to school. If he misses the bus, he will be late to
school. Charles is also carrying a bag that is full of his schoolbooks. What might appear innocent in a White neighborhood—
running while carrying a heavy bookbag—is suspicious to the
officer. The officer, deciding to stop and question Charles, runs
after him and calls out, “Hey there.”
Now let’s shift to Charles’s perspective. Charles is aware that
the officer is running after him. He hears the officer call out to
him and is processing his options. He does not want to be late to
school because he has a math exam in first period and is worried
that he will be late for the exam if he stops for the officer. He is
well aware that stopping will cost him significant time because
he has been stopped on countless occasions by the police for no

31 See Lenhardt, supra note 27, at 823 (“[R]acial stigma turns in large part upon the
context in which the stigmatized individual finds her- or himself. It cannot fully be understood without an inquiry into the social, cultural, and historical context from which it originated and in which it now exists.”); cf. Forrest Stuart, Becoming “Copwise”: Policing, Culture,
and the Collateral Consequences of Street-Level Criminalization, 50 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 279,
293–96 (2016) (describing the “innocence signals” that Skid Row residents use to avoid
contacts with the police).
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apparent reason. Each time he is stopped, he is questioned about
what he is doing, where he lives, where he is going, and why he is
going there. He is often asked for his identification. The one time
that he declined to give his identification (because he forgot it),
he was thrown up against a wall and (unlawfully) frisked. At that
moment, Charles pledged to himself that he would never forget
his ID again to avoid being harassed by the police. But now, he is
not sure that he has his it.
I have made up these facts, but what I have described is not
that far from how many Black youth have experienced interactions
(or prospective interactions) with the police. 32 Here, “hey there” is
not an innocuous request. For Black people in policed spaces, it
registers as an assertion of authority and a demand that its subject
yield to that authority. 33 This raises another problem. If he misses
the bus, Charles will suffer consequences at school. But if he continues to run, he realizes that the officer will chase him and that
he will likely be caught. Charles knows that he is not breaking
the law and has nothing on his person that could get him in trouble.
But he is torn and afraid. What should he do?
I will pause here to emphasize that Charles’s mental calculus
is not just about weighing competing options. As Professor Devon
Carbado has illustrated, 34 the choice that Charles makes here
could be highly consequential. Based on his prior life experiences
(and likely those of his friends and family), 35 Charles knows well
that the wrong move could lead to harassment or even death. 36 He
is well schooled in the practical reality of “hey there” by a police
officer. 37
32 See generally Devon W. Carbado, From Stopping Black People to Killing Black
People: The Fourth Amendment Pathways to Police Violence, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 125 (2017)
(describing the many different forms of police intervention that threaten the lives of Black
people).
33 See Brief for the N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., as Amicus
Curiae at 611–13, Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) (No. 63) [hereinafter Brief for
the LDF].
34 For additional examples, see generally Carbado, supra note 32.
35 See Bell, supra note 28, at 2100, 2118–19 (describing how victimization of individual community members undermines the community’s belief in the legitimacy of law
enforcement).
36 Cf. Carbado, supra note 32, at 164 (discussing Eric Garner’s “don’t touch me” response that eventually led to Officer Daniel Pantaleo’s use of deadly force against Garner).
37 See Brief for the LDF, supra note 33, at 35:

“Hey, there” itself, when said by a policeman, is a significant intrusion, except
perhaps to those fortunate citizens whose sole image of the police is a vague
memory of the friendly face of the school crossing guard. Such citizens are not
very often stopped. “Hey, there” to the man likely to be stopped—the man on the
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Another problem bears mentioning. Not only does Charles
have to contend with the consequences of the officer’s suspicion in
this interaction, but there is also the risk that—given his recurring
experiences with the police—he will internalize their suspicious
perceptions of him. I do not mean to suggest that Charles thinks
of himself as a perpetual suspect. Rather, because he is acutely
aware that others do, he might feel compelled to calibrate his behavior in anticipation of their reactions. 38 Charles’s decisionmaking process is a case in point. Because he knows that the officer
thinks he is suspicious, he must—in a matter of moments—engage
in a complex evaluation of his options. Most critically, he is likely
aware that the option he would prefer—running for the city bus
so that he can make it to school on time—might, in a worst-case
scenario, cost him his life. This story illustrates the human and
social-emotional costs of racially territorial policing and how it
both reflects and actualizes the subjugation of Black people in
Black spaces.
Part III applies the insights that I have just described to explain the spatial contingency of law. It discusses how Fourth
Amendment doctrine enables racially territorial practices by
granting police significant discretion to stop people in areas that
they define—often inaccurately, according to some research—as
having high levels of crime. This dynamic facilitates police practices that criminalize Black neighborhoods and the people who
reside in or frequent them. Law is spatially contingent because it
is applied differently depending on its spatial context.
III. POLICING AND THE SPATIAL CONTINGENCY OF LAW
The role of law in policing is both nuanced and spatially contingent. Law defines the range of permissible police activity, but
police culture and norms can lead to outcomes that vary from
what law formally prescribes. 39 Thus, law enforcement is a matter
of context.
street in a “bad” neighborhood, the man in the ghetto—is a challenge, an act of
dominion by the Fuzz, a thinly veiled threat of force.
38 Cf. Stuart, supra note 31, at 296–300 (describing the comprehensive spatial techniques that Skid Row residents in Los Angeles use to avoid the police, including not “standing or walking too closely to idle groups of pedestrians that had congregated along the
sidewalk”).
39 Professor Steve Herbert describes police culture through the lens of “normative
order that mix the social-structural and the cultural,” such that society and culture are
“mutually determined and interpellated.” HERBERT, supra note 14, at 18. Herbert explains:

2022]

Racially Territorial Policing in Black Neighborhoods

487

The characteristics of place 40 influence whether police respond to criminal activity and the intensity of their response.41
While law sets the parameters of police authority, police interpret
and apply law within those parameters based on their discretion,
which reflects their perceptions of the locations where suspected
criminal activity is taking place. 42 How the police interpret a place
shapes not only the kind of law enforcement that they apply but
also whether they enforce the law. 43 Police may underenforce the
law in wealthier, Whiter communities while applying it more
stringently in communities of color.
The problems of racial territoriality are exacerbated by the
lack of meaningful constitutional constraints on the authority of
police to stop and detain people.44 The potential for abuse in policing Black and Brown communities is illustrated by the New York

These normative orders consist of rules and practices that structure action. Further, these orders center on a primary value, and thereby provide meaning for
behavior. The concept of normative order thus captures the cognitive and the
affectual, the rules that people follow and the meanings they create. . . . [The use
of rules here is intended] to underscore the importance of the acquisition and
use of cognitive understandings in the conduct of everyday action.
Id. at 19. The normative orders are “law and bureaucratic control,” which “define space
for the officers and constitute more formalized and structural systems.” Id. at 22 (emphasis in original). The other orders are more subjective. These include “adventure/machismo,
safety, competence, and morality.” Id. at 23. When these normative orders conflict, the
officer has to choose which to follow. That choice, which is influenced by spatial context
and meaning, influences how and whether police follow the law.
40 See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (“[O]fficers are not required to ignore the relevant
characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently
suspicious to warrant further investigation. Accordingly, we have previously noted the fact
that the stop occurred in a ‘high crime area’ among the relevant contextual considerations
in a Terry analysis.”); HERBERT, supra note 14, at 35 (noting that “[t]he location of the
incident is[ ] recognized as crucial, because it may shape how officers view situations”).
41 See HERBERT, supra note 14, at 39 (“[L]egally permissible actions are not always
taken by police, even in the face of blatant criminal activity . . . [while] some actions are
taken without clear, defensible legal grounds.”).
42 Id. at 43 (emphasis in original):
The law is . . . an important ordering system when officers socially construct the
spaces they control. The work on police discretion demonstrates that understandings of geography affect how officers enforce the law. However, these geographic understandings are partially constructed in the first place by the law,
because the crimes defined by law influence how officers view different areas.
Id. at 36–37; see also Bell, supra note 28, at 2118 (“The twin perils of harsh policing
and neglectful policing indicate structural exclusion from public safety, an exclusion that
corresponds with intersecting race, class, and geographic marginalization.”).
44 See Brian J. Foley, Policing from the Gut: Anti-intellectualism in American Criminal
Procedure, 69 MD. L. REV. 261, 266 (2010) (arguing that Supreme Court decisions have
increased police discretion to detain and arrest, producing “a law enforcement machine
43
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City Police Department’s (NYPD) extensive use of stop and frisk.
In Floyd v. City of New York, 45 a decision that declared the
NYPD’s practices unlawful, the district court observed that the
NYPD
carrie[d] out more stops in areas with more [B]lack and
Hispanic residents, even when other relevant variables
[were] held constant. The best predictor for the rate of stops
in a geographic unit—be it precinct or census tract—is the
racial composition of that unit rather than the known crime
rate. These findings are “robust,” in the sense that the results persist even when the units of analysis are changed
from precincts to census tracts, or from calendar quarters to
months. 46
The court declared unconstitutional the NYPD’s use of stop and
frisk. 47 Nonetheless, the case reveals the proclivity of some officers
to engage in racially territorial policing. It also exposes a key
problem with Fourth Amendment doctrine. By giving officers
broad discretion to stop people based on reasonable, articulable
suspicion, 48 Fourth Amendment law increases opportunities for
that engages in overly broad searches and seizures,” and a “system [that] disproportionately ensnares poor individuals and minorities” (first citing JEFFREY REIMAN, THE RICH
GET RICHER AND THE POOR GET PRISON 109–10 (6th ed. 2001) (1979); then citing Solomon
Moore, Justice Dept. Numbers Show Prison Trends, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2007),
https://perma.cc/768C-DUN7; and then citing Associated Press, Sentencing-Guideline Study
Finds Continuing Disparities, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2004), https://perma.cc/4NZG-L9W3)).
45 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
46 Id. at 589 (citation omitted).
47 Id. at 658.
48 See Carbado, supra note 32, at 125:
This legalization of racial profiling is not a sideline or peripheral feature of
Fourth Amendment law. It is embedded in the analytical structure of the doctrine
in ways that enable police officers to force engagements with African Americans
with little or no basis. The frequency of these engagements exposes African
Americans not only to the violence of ongoing police surveillance, contact, and
social control but also to the violence of serious bodily injury and death. Which
is to say, Fourth Amendment law facilitates the space between stopping Black
people and killing Black people.
See also Jeffrey Fagan & Amanda Geller, Following the Script: Narratives of Suspicion in
Terry Stops in Street Policing, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 51, 55, 57–58 (2015) (observing that little
is known “about how officers really form suspicion . . . how they crystallize specific behaviors to reach a threshold of actionable suspicion, or for which groups of persons that suspicion most often arises”; that “what appears suspicious to the average police officer about
the behavior of a Black person may seem less suspicious or even neutral for a similarly
situated White person”; and that “police on patrol are more likely to view a minority citizen
as suspicious based on nonbehavioral cues—location, association, and appearances—while
relying more often on behavioral cues to develop suspicion for White citizens”).
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racially discriminatory policing. 49 Complicating matters is Whren
v. United States, 50 in which the Supreme Court observed—in the
context of a Fourth Amendment challenge by Black defendants to
a traffic stop that led to their arrest for violating federal drug
laws—that persons may not bring “selective enforcement” claims
alleging racial discrimination under the Fourth Amendment. 51 If
an officer stops a person because she is Black, Whren indicates
that she must allege a violation of equal protection. 52
The harm here is significant. The failure of Fourth Amendment
doctrine to protect against race-based enforcement naturalizes
the use of race as a consideration in policing, leaving it only to
equal protection’s weak constraints on racial discrimination as a
remedy. 53
These spatial dynamics and the territorial behaviors they
facilitate 54 constitute what Professor Tracey Meares describes as
the “hidden curriculum of policing.” 55 Together, these doctrines
49 As Professor William Stuntz writes, “[d]iscretion and discrimination travel together.
Ten percent of Black adults use illegal drugs; 9 percent of White adults and 8 percent of
Latinos do so,” yet “Blacks are nine times more likely than Whites and nearly three times
more likely than Latinos to serve prison sentences for drug crimes.” WILLIAM J. STUNTZ,
THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4 (2011).
50 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
51 Id. at 813.
52 As the Supreme Court observed in Whren:

We think these cases foreclose any argument that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of the individual officers
involved. We of course agree with petitioners that the Constitution prohibits
selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race. But the
constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of
laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment. Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.
Id.; cf. Paul Butler, The White Fourth Amendment, 43 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 245, 245 (2010)
(describing “the values that the Fourth Amendment protects” as “the perpetration, by law
enforcement agents, of ‘White only’ space” and the “construction of race in which nonWhiteness (especially being Black or Brown) is criminal”).
53 See generally Ian Haney-López, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779 (2012)
(discussing limitations of equal protection doctrine in the context of racial discrimination).
54 Cf. Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333, 340
(1998) (“Although the casual reader of the Court’s Fourth Amendment opinions would
never know it, race matters when measuring the dynamics and legitimacy of certain policecitizen encounters.”).
55 See Tracey Meares, Policing and Procedural Justice: Shaping Citizens’ Identities
to Increase Democratic Participation, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1525, 1530 (2017) (“Too often this
hidden curriculum of policing sends certain members of the polity signals that they are
marked as an undesirable and dangerous class of people different from everyone else—
‘anticitizen[s].’”(alteration in original) (quoting Benjamin Justice & Tracey L. Meares,
How the Criminal Justice System Educates Citizens, 651 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
SCI. 159, 172 (2014))).
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enable police to rely on race while obscuring the racial dimensions of the resulting harms. They naturalize Black space as
guilty space, which then normalizes aggressive policing of Black
people in Black neighborhoods 56—often with dire consequences.
As Professor Carbado pointedly observes, the Fourth Amendment
facilitates a dangerous leap in policing from “stopping Black people to killing Black people.” 57
IV. ILLINOIS V. WARDLOW AND THE PROBLEM OF “HIGH CRIME
AREAS”
A. Unpacking the Majority and Dissenting Opinions
The Supreme Court’s decision in Illinois v. Wardlow illustrates the dynamics of racially territorial policing. There, the
Court considered whether Mr. Wardlow’s “unprovoked flight” in
a “high crime area” justified the initial investigatory stop that
eventually led the police to discover a handgun in Wardlow’s
possession. 58
On September 9, 1995, a group of Chicago Police Department
officers were driving through a Chicago area “known for heavy
narcotics trafficking” to investigate drug transactions. 59 Officer
Nolan (the arresting officer) was in uniform, 60 though in his testimony he could not recall whether the car he was driving was
marked or unmarked. 61 As he drove, Nolan observed Wardlow
standing next to a building, holding an opaque bag. After looking
in the officers’ direction, Wardlow fled and was eventually cornered. 62 As the majority stated, Nolan “immediately conducted a
protective pat-down search for weapons because in his experience
it was common for there to be weapons in the near vicinity of

56 See E. Tendayi Achiume & Devon W. Carbado, Critical Race Theory Meets Third
World Approaches to International Law, 67 UCLA L. REV. 1462, 1489 (2021) (“The point
is that the cramped space Black people have (and historically have had) within which to
mobilize law and contest the racially subordinating features of their lives helps to ‘properize’
those features as natural (and naturally occurring) incidents in the lives of Black people.”).
57 Carbado, supra note 32, at 125.
58 Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144, 147–
48 (1972)).
59 Id. at 121.
60 People v. Wardlow, 701 N.E.2d 484, 485 (Ill. 1998).
61 Id. This fact is salient because it suggests that Wardlow may not have known that
a police car was following him. That would suggest that his flight was not due to a fear of
being discovered by the police but was perhaps based on concern for his personal safety.
62 Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 122.
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narcotics transactions.” 63 While frisking Wardlow, Nolan felt “a
heavy, hard object similar to the shape of a gun.” 64 He then opened
the bag and, upon discovering a gun, arrested Wardlow.
It is worth pausing here to consider the decision of the state
supreme court, which concluded (consistent with the majority of
jurisdictions that had addressed the same issue) 65 that the initial
stop was unlawful. 66 The state court rejected the assumption—
later embraced by the U.S. Supreme Court—that running away
from the police was sufficient justification for an investigative
stop. 67 While not explicitly using the language of territoriality, the
state court’s opinion is instructive. Noting that the “right to freedom from arbitrary governmental intrusion is as valuable on the
street as it is in the home,” the court reasoned that the “option to
‘move on’” includes the right to “refus[e] to listen or answer” to
the police. 68 It also emphasized that such refusal alone does not
constitute “reasonable, objective grounds” for detaining someone. 69 The importance of spatial freedom to move about is central
to the state court’s analysis, which cites the “right to travel, to
locomotion, to freedom of movement, [ ] to associate with others,” 70 and “to freely walk the streets.” 71 Thus, having discerned
no “independently suspicious circumstances to support an investigatory detention,” the state court concluded that the initial stop
and the subsequent arrest were unconstitutional. 72
The Supreme Court reversed. While noting that “[a]n individual’s presence in an area of expected criminal activity, standing
alone, is not enough to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion that the person is committing a crime,” 73 it concluded that
Wardlow’s “unprovoked flight” in a “high crime area” satisfied the
standard. 74

63

Id.
Id.
65 Wardlow, 701 N.E.2d at 487–88.
66 Id. at 489.
67 Id. at 486 (calling for “proof of some independently suspicious circumstance to corroborate” the inference of guilt “associated with flight at the sight of the police” (quoting
State v. Hicks, 488 N.W.2d 359, 363 (Neb. 1992))).
68 Id. at 486–87 (quoting Hicks, 488 N.W.2d at 363).
69 Id. at 487 (quoting Hicks, 488 N.W.2d at 363).
70 Wardlow, 701 N.E.2d at 487.
71 Id. (quoting City of Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53, 65 (Ill. 1997)).
72 Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123.
73 Id. at 124 (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979)).
74 Id. at 124–25.
64
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While the Court had observed one dimension of spatial context—the purportedly high degree of crime in the area—it ignored
another, which is the justifiable fear that many Black people have
of police abuse in Black neighborhoods. 75 As an amicus brief from
the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. (LDF)
pointedly explained:
[T]he documented problems of police abuse are most serious
in precisely those areas where police are most quick to presume guilt, and the protections of the Fourth Amendment
must not be allowed to mean one thing for the residents of
our inner cities (those who are most vulnerable to unreasonable and dangerous police conduct) and another for those who
live in our Nation’s “low-crime” enclaves. 76
It is important to see the competing interpretations of spatial
meaning in the majority opinion and the LDF brief in Wardlow
and how they bear on whether the police had “reasonable, articulable suspicion” 77 to stop and ultimately arrest Wardlow. To the
Court, the minority neighborhood was a guilty (i.e., high-crime)
space—so much so that flight within it, without any apparent connection to suspected criminal activity, could justify the stop. The
LDF brief, in contrast, argued that residents within inner-city
spaces were vulnerable to police abuse and, therefore, required
more protection from police intrusion. 78 Thus, while the Court
sought to justify the territorial exercise of police control over
“guilty” space, the LDF brief argued for a tighter Fourth
Amendment standard that would afford Black space (and the
people within it) the same presumptive freedoms as “low-crime”
(presumably White) spaces. 79
See Brief for the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Respondent at 9, Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (No. 98-1036) [hereinafter LDF Brief]
(citations omitted):
75

Moreover, while Illinois and its amici profess to accept the Terry principle that
reviewing courts must examine the totality of the circumstances before adjudging
an encounter reasonable as a constitutional matter, none discuss or consider a
factor that has enormous relevance to understanding why inner-city AfricanAmerican residents would flee from police. That circumstance is fear, the sincere
and understandable response that many inner-city minority residents — the
law-abiding no less than the criminal — [give] to potential encounters of any
type with police.
76
77
78
79

Id. at 4 (emphasis in original).
Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123.
See LDF Brief, supra note 75, at 4.
Id.
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Unlike the majority opinion, the Wardlow dissent discusses
territoriality only in passing. For example, while observing that
an “individual’s presence in an area of expected criminal activity,
standing alone, is not enough to” justify a stop, the majority concluded that its occurrence in “a high crime area” is relevant. 80 As
to the matter of Wardlow’s flight, however, the dissent was more
nuanced. While acknowledging the possible relevance of the
“character of the neighborhood,” 81 it explained why an innocent
person might run for reasons that have nothing to do with the
police. It noted, for example, that one might run
to catch up with a friend a block or two away, to seek shelter
from an impending storm, to arrive at a bus stop before the
bus leaves, to get home in time for dinner, to resume jogging
after a pause for rest, to avoid contact with a bore or bully, or
simply to answer the call of nature—any of which might coincide with the arrival of an officer in the vicinity. 82
In other words, there is nothing inherently suspicious about running, and the Court should not presume that those who happen
to be running are trying to escape the police. 83
Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124.
Id. at 129 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
82 Id. at 128–29.
83 See id. at 132 (“[T]here is also the possibility that the fleeing person is entirely
innocent, but, with or without justification, believes that contact with the police can itself
be dangerous, apart from any criminal activity associated with the officer’s sudden presence.”); see also, e.g., Bell, supra note 28, at 2110–11 (describing the perspective of a young
Black woman in Baltimore who observed that “running away from police is a standard
practice for young men even when they are clean (i.e., not carrying anything illegal)”).
Herbert offers another explanation for police conduct in high crime areas based on his
understanding of the culture of policing in the Wilshire Division of the Los Angeles Police
Department. According to Herbert, more is at stake than simple crime; some measure of
ego is involved:
80
81

The more aggressive [police] response . . . results from [a] group’s attempted
flight. Flight not only constitutes evidence of criminal activity but also is a direct
challenge to the officers’ sense of competence. To allow the group to flee without
a response would be an indefensible admission that they do not exercise control
over the areas for which they are responsible. When a direct challenge is issued,
the officers’ sense of themselves as capable territorial agents demands that they
jump hurriedly from the car even though, moments before, they considered it
prudent to refrain from an identical action.
HERBERT, supra note 14, at 124–25. Of course, Herbert’s conclusions are based on his own
reading of this particular jurisdiction’s police culture. That culture likely differs by department, by geography, and by the personality and temperament of officers. Nonetheless,
his conclusions provide a window into how at least some officers approach policing in highcrime areas and the troubling dangers that these approaches pose for residents in those
areas.
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B. The Costs of Wardlow
The first sentence of the majority opinion in Wardlow reads
as follows: “Respondent Wardlow fled upon seeing police officers
patrolling an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking.” 84
There are two critical moves in this sentence. The first is to
emphasize that Wardlow “fled” after seeing the police, and the
second move is to make clear that he did so in an area “known”
for drug trafficking, which presumably means that it was known
to the officers who were patrolling the area. The opinion later explains that “[t]he officers were traveling together because they
expected to find a crowd of people in the area, including lookouts
and customers” 85 Yet it is not clear that the officers suspected
Wardlow of unlawful activity until he ran.
It would be reasonable to point out that Wardlow was in fact
violating the law by carrying, as the Court noted, “a .38-caliber
handgun with five live rounds of ammunition.” 86 Others might
also find some relief in Wardlow’s arrest, especially if they lived
in the vicinity or frequented the area. People want to feel safe,
after all.
Bad facts make bad law. But what if we tweaked the facts?
Instead of the gun, let’s say that Wardlow was carrying a small
hammer (also in an opaque bag) that he had just purchased at a
local hardware store and was waiting for the bus to take him
home so he could nail together a broken cabinet in his kitchen.
Let’s further assume in this scenario that he decided to run because he is often harassed by the police. My point here is that
Wardlow applies to the law-abiding person as well as to those who
are breaking the law.
This observation raises a larger question about our social
tolerance for infringements on personal liberty. Many are quite
comfortable sacrificing the liberty of others, but would those with
privilege and power in “‘low-crime’ enclaves” 87 tolerate a legal regime that granted such significant latitude to the police to stop
them? The problem with Wardlow is that it readily translates innocent behavior into something that is presumptively suspicious.
As the dissent notes, there are human costs to this approach. It
reminds the majority that “[e]ven a limited search . . . constitutes

84
85
86
87

Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 121.
Id.
Id. at 122.
See LDF Brief, supra note 75, at 4.
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a severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security”—an intrusion that “must be an annoying, frightening, and
perhaps humiliating experience.” 88
Thus, what the majority opinion takes to be a simple matter
of “commonsense judgment[ ] and inference[ ] about human behavior” 89 has real-world implications. For those who do not live in
Black neighborhoods, the costs of racially territorial policing are
largely hidden. As a practical matter, no one will be free to run in
a high-crime area if the police are around because one’s “unprovoked flight” may be interpreted as evasion of the police. Knowing
this, many may adjust their routines to avoid the hassle if they
see the police or suspect that they are near. They might decide
not to take a run around the neighborhood, or they might exercise
caution when playing games with their friends in a park. They
might avoid walking fast to make it home for dinner. This is the
psychic cost of racial territoriality: the heightened sense that danger at the hands of the police is always around the corner, even
during the most ordinary and mundane activities of day-to-day life.
C. Addressing the Community-Safety Argument
One might argue that the possibility of criminal activity justifies police officers’ decisions to stop people who are, for all apparent purposes, trying to evade them by running away. Why divest
the police of authority—the argument goes—to prevent crime
simply because some innocent people might be unfairly targeted
in the process? Continuing this line of argument, a critic might
also contend that a person who is “truly innocent” will not mind
being stopped by the police because they understand that this inconvenience is the price of public safety.
One can discern threads of this argument in Wardlow. Its
difficulty is that it rests on a very thin conception of “safety” for
the people who reside in Black neighborhoods or other low-income
neighborhoods of color. Victimization of any Black person undermines the community’s collective sense of safety. And the victimization of one member of the community means that anyone can
similarly be victimized. If someone is not safe, then no one is. 90
Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 127 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1968)).
89 Id. at 125 (majority opinion).
90 See Bell, supra note 28, at 2104–14 (discussing how individuals incorporate community experiences in understanding the possibilities for negative interactions with the
police).
88
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Nor can a vague appeal to public safety justify police officers’
broad authority to stop people who are fleeing in areas that are
defined by the police as having high levels of crime. First, there is
the reality that Black people run from the police because they
(justifiably) fear police harassment and abuse. Second, there is a
high likelihood that when general references are made to public
safety, they do not include Black people. “Safety” is raced as
White, as is “the public.” Because Black people are stereotyped as
dangerous, they are functionally excluded from the body politic.91
Thus, their safety is not a matter of public concern.
D. The Inaccuracy of the “High Crime Area”
There is another question that bears on the legitimacy of
Wardlow. Even assuming, as the Wardlow majority did, that unprovoked flight in a high-crime area is a legitimate basis for reasonable suspicion, how confident can we be of the accuracy of
“high crime” designations by the police?
A recent study by Professors Ben Grunwald and Jeffrey Fagan
calls into question police judgments that areas have high levels
of crime. 92 They argue that Wardlow rested on three unarticulated empirical assumptions. 93 First, a “high-crime area” should
be analyzed as a smaller geographic unit, such as a street block
or intersection, rather than an entire neighborhood or city. 94 Second, officers’ identification of an area as “high crime” is “relatively
accurate.” 95 Third, an officer’s identification of an area as “high
crime” should predict whether a suspect’s presence in that area
means that they are involved in crime. 96
Grunwald and Fagan’s study suggests that none of these assumptions are justified when it comes to actual “high-crime area”
designations. Their conclusions are based on nearly 2.5 million
stops conducted by the NYPD between 2007 and 2012 under its
stop-and-frisk policy. The authors concluded that implementation
of the high-crime-area standard in New York City during this
91 See id. at 2067 (“The concept of legal estrangement has the power to reorient police
reform efforts because it clarifies the real problem of policing: at both an interactional and
structural level, current regimes can operate to effectively banish whole communities from
the body politic.”).
92 See Ben Grunwald & Jeffrey Fagan, The End of Intuition-Based High-Crime Areas,
107 CALIF. L. REV. 345, 396 (2019).
93 Id. at 367–70.
94 Id. at 367–68.
95 Id. at 368.
96 Id. at 370.
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period appears to have been “haphazard at best, and discriminatory at worst”; 97 that the police indiscriminately used the “highcrime area” designation across the city; and that every block in
the city had—at one point or another—been identified by police
officers as having high levels of crime. 98
Most importantly for my purposes, Grunwald and Fagan concluded that “[t]he racial composition of the area and the identity
of the officer [were] stronger predictors of whether an officer
deem[ed] an area high crime than the crime rate.” 99 Finally, they
noted the possibility that high-crime designations were used as a
“cover to bolster the appearance of constitutional validity in their
weakest”—that is, most unjustified—“stops.” 100
This study is of only one (very large) jurisdiction, but the results are alarming. It suggests the proclivity of police to misuse
the “high-crime area” designation to justify aggressive policing in
ways that also feed racial stereotypes about Black people in Black
neighborhoods. These overly broad designations stigmatize Black
space as criminal space of the presumptively suspect. The stigmatization of Black space as guilty space makes it easier for the police
to justify their territorialization and to dominate, contain, and
subjugate the people within. 101 In so doing, it impairs the freedom
to move throughout the everyday spaces of Black neighborhoods.
CONCLUSION
Space is a critical, but often neglected, frame for understanding racial inequality. This Essay sought to explain why space
matters in the context of policing, the spatial harms that racially

See Grunwald & Fagan, supra note 92, at 396.
Id. at 383–84 (“[O]fficers called 98 percent of the block groups in the city high
crime in at least 30 percent of stops conducted in those areas. In other words, officers are
claiming that every block in New York City is high crime at one time or another.”).
99 Id. at 352.
100 Id.
101 Cf. Bell, supra note 12, at 655 (describing the “mutually constitutive relationship
between daily practices of urban policing and residential segregation”); Fagan & Ash, supra
note 29, at 120:
97
98

When police routinely and promiscuously intervene in the everyday lives of citizens, they impose interaction costs that inevitably deter residents from moving
freely. . . . Because police deployments and actions are racialized and focused in
poor and segregated places, police in effect reproduce inequality, racial stratification, and segregation through criminal legal enforcement actions that can constrain mobility.
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territorial policing creates, and the toll on individuals and communities that such policing exacts.
We should pause here to reflect on the damning precarity of
Black lives in predominantly Black neighborhoods and the stereotypes and ideations that perpetuate that status. Racially territorial
policing is hypercomplicit in this affair. It spatializes notions of
Black inferiority and White superiority onto neighborhood spaces
through processes of marginalization, exclusion, and concentration. Black space is naturalized as subordinated space, which is
often followed by a denial of resources and opportunities. 102
There are individual harms too. They include the stigma of
experiencing oneself as a perpetual suspect and the fight it takes
to resist that marginalization; the loss of freedom to be left alone
and to move (unquestioned) through space according to one’s will;
and, finally, the sense that there are too few places where one is
free to just be.

102 See generally Lenese C. Herbert, Can’t You See What I’m Saying? Making Expressive
Conduct a Crime in High-Crime Areas, 9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 135 (2002)
(providing a first-person account of a former assistant U.S. attorney’s experiences in court
and how readily high crime area designations were accepted not only by law enforcement
but also by defense counsel and judges).

